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In two studies, we investigate the effect of individuals’ promotion and prevention focus on
engagement in collective action. We show that responding to group-based disadvantage
out of a sense of moral conviction motivates prevention-oriented– but not promotion-
oriented– individuals to engage in collective action. Furthermore, holding such strong
moral convictions about the fair treatment of their group causes the prevention-oriented
to disregard societal rules against hostile forms of collective action (i.e., forms of
action that are aimed at harming the interests of those held responsible for the group’s
disadvantage). Study 1 showed that prevention-oriented individuals, but not promotion-
oriented individuals, with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their
group are willing to support both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action.
Study 2 replicated this effect and showed that for prevention-oriented individuals but
not for promotion-oriented individuals, holding a strong moral conviction about the fair
treatment of the group overrides moral objections to hostile forms of collective action
in the decision to support these forms of action.
In late 2005, youths from the poor suburban housing projects of Paris took to the
streets to protest against their seemingly hopeless position. These protests quickly
turned violent. Rioting soon spread to other French cities. At the end of the civil unrest,
weeks later, thousands of cars had been burned and damage was estimated to be over
$230 million (Landler, 2005). As this example demonstrates, people sometimes respond
to the disadvantaged position of their group by engaging in violent protests and riots.
At other times they do so by participating in more peaceful forms of protest. In the
current research, we investigate how individuals decide between taking peaceful versus
more violent forms of collective action from the perspective of regulatory focus theory
(Higgins, 1997). By taking a self-regulatory perspective in our investigation of collective
action, we aim to provide a further understanding of when and why members of low-
status groups sometimes choose to go beyond the rules of society, or even beyond what
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they themselves would normally find morally acceptable, to try to improve their group’s
disadvantaged position.
We argue that perceiving immoral treatment of the ingroup should form a strong
motivation to engage in collective action among prevention-oriented individuals but
not among promotion-oriented individuals. Crucially, we propose that a prevention
orientation entails the kind of rationality in which strong motivation is experienced as
necessity. This ‘necessity’ is predicted to cause the prevention-oriented – when they
hold a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group – to perceive any
means as justified in order to achieve group status improvement. This should also be
true for those means that are intended to harm the interests of those held responsible for
the group’s disadvantage: hostile or non-normative forms of collective action (Wright,
Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a).
In the next section, we discuss hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. We
then turn to work on moral conviction and regulatory focus and explain how integrating
insights from these fields can help further our understanding of the willingness to engage
in hostile and benevolent forms of collective action.
Hostile and benevolent forms of collective action
Collective action – cooperative effort towards group status improvement – can be a
powerful instrument for low-status groups to improve their societal position (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). In the last decades, a large volume of social psychological research has
attempted to identify factors that motivate members of low-status groups to engage
in this form of behaviour (cf. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ellemers, Wilke, &
Van Knippenberg, 1993; Klandermans, 1984; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke,
1999; Simon et al., 1998; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). This research
has taught usmuch about the conditions underwhich low-status groupmembers become
motivated to improve the societal position of their group. However, most of this work has
focused on the motivation to engage in relatively benevolent responses to group-based
disadvantage, such as signing petitions, participating in peaceful demonstrations and
aligning oneself with legitimate political movements. In doing so, social psychological
research has provided less insight into the willingness to engage in more hostile forms
of collective action that are explicitly aimed at harming the interests of those held
responsible for the group’s disadvantage, such as committing acts of vandalism and
participating in riots (Brewer, 1999, but see Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005; Reicher &
Levine, 1994; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a, 1990b; Wright & Taylor, 1998, for
notable exceptions, see Gurr, 1993, for a sociological account).
Importantly, previous work has found that both activists and lay people perceive
these hostile forms of collective action to be clearly distinct from the more benevolent
ones, indicating that individuals committed to collective action are not always willing
to turn to hostile means such as rioting and vandalism to reach their goals (Corning &
Myers, 2002; Lalonde & Cameron, 1994; Lalonde, Stroink, & Aleem, 2002; Scheepers,
Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994). What is it
that makes some members of low-status groups decide that achievement of group status
improvement justifies the use of these extreme, hostile means? Existing research on
this topic suggests that people may only become willing to engage in hostile forms of
collective action when their group is confronted with exceptionally unfair and immoral
treatment (Wright et al., 1990a, 1990b). For this reason, we believe that in order to
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understand the willingness to take hostile forms of collective action, we must first
examine the role of morality in the decision to engage in collective action in more detail.
Moral conviction
The extent to which individuals hold a moral conviction about the fair treatment of their
group should form a strong motivator of collective action. The term moral conviction
refers to a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral
(Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, 2002; Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka &
Mullen, 2002). Moral convictions differ from other strong, but non-moral attitudes in that
they are seen as universally applicable truths. For example, the preference for one form
ofmusic over another can be a strong attitude, but as a matter of personal taste or opinion
it is not a moral attitude (Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2009). By contrast, attitudes about
issues such as abortion, ethnic cleansing, and murder are usually considered ‘moral’
in nature in that they refer to the distinction between right and wrong. Individuals
holding these moral attitudes (1) believe that their stance reflects what is objectively
right, not just personal opinion; (2) contend that others, regardless of their background,
should share their stance on these issues; and (3) experience feelings of anger when
confronted with what is seen as ‘immorality’ (Skitka et al., 2005). Moreover, moral
conviction, more than other types of attitudes, carries within it the obligation to act
(Skitka et al., 2005), and is even seen to even justify aggression against those who do not
share the same moral convictions (Mullen & Skitka, 2006). We apply these individual-
level findings to understand group-level concerns. Based on these findings, we argue
that when group members who hold a moral conviction about the fair treatment of their
group are confronted with unfair group-based treatment, they should experience group-
based anger and feel an inner obligation to act against the disadvantage (Van Zomeren,
Postmes, & Spears, in press). Both of these experiences are considered to be strong
motivators of collective action (Stu¨rmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jo¨rger, 2003; Van Zomeren
et al., 2004).
However, we do not believe that having a strong moral conviction about the fair
treatment of the groupmotivates actual engagement in collective action for all individuals
or in all situations. In the next section, we will argue that because moral considerations
function as ‘oughts’ (Higgins, 1987; Skitka, 2003), their motivating force should depend
on the strength of individuals’ prevention focus. We will then argue that prevention-
oriented individuals who engage in collective action out of their moral convictions
about the fair treatment of their group view the goal of this behaviour as a necessity,
causing them to see the ends as justifying the means and paving the way for hostile forms
of collective action.
A self-regulation approach to collective action
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) distinguishes between twomotivational systems
that regulate goal-directed behaviour: the prevention system and the promotion system.
These systems affect which kinds of goals are pursued and how the motivation to
pursue these goals is experienced. Prevention and promotion focus vary in strength
both chronically across individuals and momentarily across situations (Higgins et al.,
2001).
We argue that holding a moral conviction about the fair treatment of one’s group
should predict engagement in collective action in response to group-based disadvantage
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among individuals with a strong prevention focus. Furthermore, we argue that this
moral conviction should be less important in determining the way individuals with a
weak prevention focus or individuals with a promotion focus respond to group-based
disadvantage. Adoption of a prevention focus indicates a concern with safety and the
fulfilment of duties and responsibilities, also referred to as ‘oughts’. Under prevention
focus, strong motivation is experienced as the necessity of goal attainment, which causes
unsuccessful goal pursuit to be seen as more negative than successful pursuit is seen
as positive (Higgins, 1987; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Shah & Higgins, 1997).
Notably, moral considerations function as ‘oughts’ (Higgins, 1987; Skitka, 2003; Skitka
& Mullen, 2002), as immorality is judged to be more negative than morality is judged to
be positive (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989). Viewed in this way, moral conviction
forms the strong motivation to pursue specific prevention-relevant goals. The fact that
moral considerations function as oughts implies that the motivating effects of moral
convictions should depend on the strength of the individual’s prevention focus. Thus,
we predict that holding amoral conviction about the fair treatment of one’s group should
motivate collective action to redress to group-based disadvantage among individuals
with a strong prevention focus but not among individuals with a weak prevention focus
(Hypothesis 1).
By contrast, adoption of a promotion focus indicates a concern with gain and the
achievement of growth and accomplishment goals rather than duties and responsibilities.
Promotion-oriented individuals are motivated to pursue ideals, or maximal goals. A
promotion orientation involves experiencing strong motivation as desire that causes
successful goal pursuit to be seen as more positive than unsuccessful pursuit is seen as
negative. (Higgins, 1987; Idson et al., 2000; Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, because moral
considerations function as ‘oughts’ and not as ‘ideals’, we do not anticipate that holding a
moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group should motivate collective action
to redress group-based disadvantage among individuals under promotion focus.
Hostile forms of collective action
We propose that holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their
group should cause prevention-oriented individuals to overcome normative objections
(and even their own moral objections) to hostile forms of collective action. Prevention-
oriented individuals construe strong goals, such as those mandated by moral conviction,
as necessities (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Shah & Higgins, 1997;
Zaal, Van Laar, Sta˚hl, Ellemers, & Derks, in press). When pursuing a goal of which the
achievement is seen as a necessity, it should not matter how this goal is achieved, as long
as it is achieved. This means that prevention-oriented individuals (but not promotion-
oriented individuals) who hold a strongmoral conviction about the fair treatment of their
group should consider hostile forms of collective action as justified means to a necessary
end. Thus, we predict that for prevention-oriented individuals, holding a strong moral
conviction about the fair treatment of their group should motivate support for hostile
forms of collective action (Hypothesis 2).
Overview of the studies
Two studies were conducted to test the predictions concerning individual prevention
focus and engagement in different forms of collective action. We used a paradigm in
which women were made aware of the discrimination of their group in work situations.
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They were then asked to indicate their support for several hostile and benevolent forms
of collective reactions to this discrimination (Corning & Myers, 2002; Wolfsfeld et al.,
1994). The extent to which participants supported these hostile and benevolent forms
of collective action served as the dependent variable in both studies.
We used different ways to examine how support for hostile and benevolent forms
of collective reactions to social discrimination among women is affected by regulatory
focus and by the strength of their moral conviction about the equality between men and
women. In Study 1, chronic individual differences in promotion and prevention focus
and the strength of participants’ moral conviction about the equality between men
and women were assessed as independent variables. In Study 2, we used a situational
induction of regulatory focus, instead of assessing it as an individual difference variable,
and again assessed naturally occurring variations in the strength of participants’ moral
conviction about the fair treatment of their group as an independent variable. In addition,
we included an assessment of moral objection to hostile forms of collective action as a
potential moderator. All items used to measure the independent and dependent variables
are included in the Appendix.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
One hundred and eighty-two female undergraduate students from Leiden University
(Mage = 20.44, SD = 2.24) participated for €3 or course credit.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies:
a short survey and an experiment. The short survey consisted of our pre-measure
of regulatory focus. We measured participants’ chronic promotion ( = .81) and
prevention focus ( = .76) with a shortened version of the Lockwood scale (Lockwood,
Jordan, & Kunda, 2002).1 Participants were then informed that the first study was
completed and that the second study would now commence. Next, they read a research
report supposedly written by two well-known Dutch research organizations, which was
constructed to make participants aware of the disadvantaged position of their group
(women) in work situations. Participants read that women earn approximately 7% less
than men for the same work, and receive fewer opportunities for job advancement.
Measures
All variables weremeasured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree)
to 9 (completely agree). The correlations between the measures are included in Table 1.
The strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality was measured
using five items (e.g., ‘Equality between men and women is part of the core of my moral
convictions’,  = .76).
1Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the promotion and prevention scales could be empirically distinguished. The
proposed two-factor structure fit better than the one-factor structure ( 2 = 211, df = 1, p  .001).
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Table 1. Correlations between measures (Study 1)
Moral conviction Support for Support for
Promotion about gender benevolent collective hostile collective
focus equality action action
Prevention focus .12 .14 .25∗∗∗ .14
Promotion focus .28∗∗∗ .12 .03
Moral conviction about
gender equality
.26∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗
Support for benevolent
collective action
.37∗∗∗
Support for hostile
collective action
∗p  .05; ∗∗p  .01; ∗∗∗p  .001.
Support for benevolent forms of collective action was measured by asking partici-
pants to report the extent to which they supported four different types of benevolent
collective action (e.g., ‘Becoming a member of a collective action group that takes a
stance against gender discrimination’,  = .92).
Support for hostile forms of collective action was measured by asking participants
to report the extent to which they supported four different types of hostile (and illegal)
action (e.g., ‘Committing sabotage within discriminating organizations’,  = .78).2
Results
We used hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypothesis that prevention focus
influences the effect of the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality
on support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. For the analyses of
both dependent variables, the standardized promotion and prevention measures and
the standardized measure of moral conviction about the gender equality were entered
into the analysis in the first step. In the second step, the two two-way interaction terms
between the moral conviction measure and each of the regulatory focus measures were
included.
Support for benevolent forms of collective action
Analysis of the support for benevolent forms of collective action showed the predicted
interaction between prevention focus and the strength of participants’ moral conviction
about gender equality, B = .23, SE = .10, F(1,176) = 5.47, p = .02, R2 = .03, see
Figure 1. Simple slope analyses of this effect (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that the
strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality increased support for
2Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the support for hostile and benevolent collective action scales could be empirically
distinguished. The proposed two-factor structure fit better than the one-factor structure ( 2 = 168, df = 1, p  .001).
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Figure 1. Support for benevolent forms of collective action as a function of prevention focus and the
strength of the moral conviction about the gender equality (Study 1).
benevolent forms of collective action among participants high in prevention focus (+ 1
SD), B = .54, SE = .13, F(1,176) = 16.10, p < .001, but not among participants low in
prevention focus, (–1 SD), B = .09, SE = .16, F(1,176) < 1, p = .56. Promotion focus
was unrelated to support for benevolent forms of collective action, B = .02, SE = .11,
F(1,176) < 1, p = .84, as was its interaction with the strength of participants’ moral
conviction about gender equality, B = –.11, SE = .09, F(1,176) = 1.47, p = .23.
Support for hostile forms of collective action
Analysis of the support for hostile forms of collective action measure showed the
predicted interaction between prevention focus and the strength of participants’ moral
conviction about gender equality, B = .30, SE = .10, F(1,176) = 8.29, p = .004,
R2 = .04, see Figure 2. As expected, simple slope analyses revealed that the strength of
participants’ moral conviction about gender equality increased support for hostile forms
of collective action among individuals high in prevention focus, (+ 1 SD), B = .73,
SE = .14, F(1,178) = 26.82, p < .001, but not among participants low in prevention
focus, (–1 SD), B = .13, SE = .16, F < 1. Promotion focus was unrelated to support for
hostile forms of collective action, B = –.12, SE = .12, F(1,176) = 1.05, p = .31, as was
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Figure 2. Support for hostile forms of collective action as a function of prevention focus and the
strength of the moral conviction about gender equality (Study 1).
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its interaction with the strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality,
B = –.01, SE = .09, F < 1.
Discussion and introduction to Study 2
The results of this first study provide initial evidence for the hypothesis that support for
both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action in response to social discrimination
can best be seen as prevention-oriented response to perceived immorality. As expected,
among participants high in prevention focus, the strength of moral conviction about
gender equality increased endorsement of both hostile and benevolent forms of collective
action. Among participants with low prevention focus, the strength of this moral
conviction had no effect on the endorsement of either form of collective action. Also as
expected, promotion focus did not influence the relation between the strength of the
moral conviction about gender equality and the support for either form of collective
action.
However, this first study does have some limitations. First of all, the fact that
regulatory focus was assessed, rather than manipulated, leaves open another explanation
of the results. Previous work has shown that becoming aware of being a member
of a disadvantaged group in itself can cause individuals to adopt a prevention focus
(Oyserman, Uskul, Yoder, Nesse, & Williams, 2007; Seibt & Forster, 2004). Therefore,
it could be the chronic awareness of being a member of a disadvantaged group, rather
than the chronic prevention focus resulting from it, that causes support for hostile
forms of collective action when this disadvantage is seen as immoral. In addition,
recent work has identified some shortcomings of the Lockwood scale that was used
as a measure of regulatory focus in Study 1 (Summerville & Roese, 2008). For these
reasons a different, experimental, operationalisation of regulatory focus was employed in
Study 2.
A second concern with the current study is that, based on its results, we cannot yet
rule out that it is the perceived importance of countering gender inequality rather than
the moral conviction with which this goal is pursued, that is responsible for the effects
(cf. Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). For this reason, we controlled for the effects of the
perceived importance of countering gender inequality when examining the influence of
moral convictions in Study 2.
In addition, an important question that is left unanswered by Study 1 concerns the
moral objections peoplemay have against hostile forms of collective action. If prevention-
oriented individuals base their decision of whether or not to support hostile forms of
collective action on moral reasoning, then at the same time these individuals may be
deterred from the use of such forms of collective action by the perception that these
behaviours are immoral. While we acknowledge this possibility, we also argue that moral
objections to hostile forms of collective action will not always decrease support for this
form of action among prevention-oriented individuals. More specifically, we argue that
for prevention-oriented individuals, strong motivation (such as the motivation to pursue
gender equality for those who hold this goal with moral conviction) is experienced
as necessity of goal attainment (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal et al., in press). We argue
that this perceived necessity of goal attainment may supersede moral objections to
the way these goals are pursued, causing individuals to believe that in this particular
instance, the use of ‘immoral’ hostile forms of collective action is justified. Therefore,
we predict that holding moral objections to hostile forms of collective action should
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decrease support for these forms of action among prevention-oriented individuals
without a strong moral conviction about gender equality, but not among prevention-
oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about gender equality. Among
individuals under promotion focus, neither the strength of moral objections to hostile
forms of collective action nor the strength ofmoral convictions about gender equalitywas
expected to influence support for hostile forms of collective action. These predictions
were investigated in Study 2.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and fifty-one female undergraduate students from Leiden University
(Mage = 20.30, SD = 2.28) participated for €3.50 or course credit. They were randomly
assigned to the conditions of a one-factor (regulatory focus: promotion or prevention)
between-participants experiment. The strength of participants’ moral convictions about
gender equality and the strength of their moral objections to hostile forms of collective
action were measured as independent variables. As in Study 1, support for benevolent
(behavioural) and hostile forms of collective action served as the dependent variables.3
Procedure
We used the same procedure as in Study 1, with two differences. First, we manipulated
(instead of measured) participants’ regulatory focus. Second, we included a measure
of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action. We manipulated regulatory
focus with an adapted version of the procedure suggested by Higgins and colleagues
(Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Zaal et al., in press). Prior to being presented
with the other materials, participants wrote about what they would ideally like to
(promotion condition) or felt they ought to (prevention condition) achieve in their
working life. According to Higgins and colleagues (1994), the priming of ideals leads
individuals to adopt a promotion focus, whereas the priming of oughts causes individuals
to adopt a prevention focus. Participants then read the same research report about the
discrimination of women in work situations as in Study 1.
Measures
All variables weremeasured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree)
to 9 (completely agree) unless otherwise reported. The correlations between the
measures are included in Table 2.
The importance of countering gender inequality was measured with three items
(e.g., ‘Countering gender discrimination is very important to me’,  = .85).
3Because of methodological difficulties associated with assessing personal engagement in actual hostile forms of collective
action under controlled circumstances, we could not measure this as a behavioural variable.
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Table 2. Correlations between measures (Study 2)
Importance of Moral objections to Support for Signed the
countering gender hostile collective hostile collective petition (benevolent
inequality action action collective action)
Moral conviction
about gender
equality
.43∗∗∗ −.03. 27∗∗∗ .23∗∗
Importance of
countering gender
inequality
−.16 .21∗ .17∗
Moral objections to
hostile collective
action
−.17∗ −.04
Support for hostile
collective action
.20∗
Signed the petition
(benevolent
collective action)
∗p  .05; ∗∗p  .01; ∗∗∗p  .001.
The strength of moral conviction about the gender equality was measured with
five items (e.g., ‘Equality between men and women is part of the core of my moral
convictions’,  = .72).4
Moral objections to hostile forms of collective actionwere measured with four items
(e.g., ‘Harming the interests of organizations that discriminate is morally objectionable’,
 = .63).
Tomeasure support for benevolent collective action, we gave participants the option
to sign a petition calling for measures against gender discrimination within organizations.
Support for hostile forms of collective action was measured by asking participants
to report the extent to which they supported five different forms of hostile action (e.g.,
‘Committing sabotage at discriminating organizations’,  = .71).
Results
Manipulation check
To check whether or not the manipulation of regulatory focus was successful, seven
judges, who were blind to condition, independently rated the focus of the paragraphs
that the participants wrote as –1 (prevention-oriented), 0 (unclear), or + 1 (promotion-
oriented). The judgments showed a very high degree of consistency ( = .94) and were
thus collapsed into a single bipolar variable that reflects the mean judgment of the
coders. High scores on this variable indicate promotion-oriented paragraphs, low scores
prevention-oriented paragraphs. Analysis of variance showed that the essays of partici-
pants in the promotion condition, M = .75, SD = .31, were coded as significantly more
4Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the scales measuring moral conviction about gender equality and the importance
attached to countering gender inequality could be empirically distinguished. The proposed two-factor structure fit better than
the one-factor structure (X2 = 60, df = 1, p  .001).
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Figure 3. The predicted probability of signing the petition as a function of the strength of the moral
conviction about gender equality in the promotion and prevention conditions (Study 2).
promotion focused (and thus also as less prevention focused) than those of participants
in the prevention condition,M = –.57, SD = .59, F(1,149) = 301.60, p < .001, 2 = .67.
We therefore concluded that the manipulation of regulatory focus was successful.
Benevolent collective action
Benevolent collective action (signing the petition) was analysed using logistic regression.
Ninety-six participants (out of a total of 151) signed the petition (64%). The effect-
coded manipulation of regulatory focus (–1 for the prevention condition, 1 for the
promotion condition), the standardized moral conviction scale and their interaction
term were entered into the analysis. To rule out the possibility that the importance of
countering gender inequality – instead of the strength of participants’ moral conviction
about gender equality – could be responsible for the effects, we entered into the
analysis this variable and its interaction with the manipulation of regulatory focus
(see Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004).5 The results revealed the predicted interaction
between the strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality and the
manipulation of regulatory focus, Hypothesis 1, B = –.52, SE = .23,  2 (1) = 5.20,
p = .02, see Figure 3. As anticipated, moral conviction increased the odds of signing the
petition among participants in the prevention condition, B = 1.08, SE = .38,  2 (1) =
8.22, p = .004, but not among participants in the promotion condition, B = .05,
SE = .25,  2 (1) = 0.04, p = .84. No other effects reached significance, ps > .22.6
Support for hostile forms of collective action
Support for hostile forms of collective action was analysed using regression analysis.
The effect-coded manipulation, the standardized moral conviction and moral objection
5Not including the importance of countering gender inequality and its interaction with regulatory focus does not substantially
alter the results (focus x moral conviction interaction, p = .007).
6Benevolent collective action was unrelated to moral objections to hostile forms of collective action (r[151] = .04, p = .66)
and to any of its interactions with the other independent variables (p .79), attesting to the fact that signing the petition was
not seen as hostile. The interaction between the manipulation of regulatory focus and moral conviction on the odds of signing
the petition was not further qualified by moral objections to hostile forms of collective action (three-way interaction p = .93).
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Figure 4. Support for hostile forms of collective action as a function of the strength of moral objections
to these forms of action and the strength of moral conviction about gender equality in the prevention
condition (Study 2).
scales, as well as their two- and three-way interaction termswere entered into the analysis
as independent variables. We entered the standardized measure of the importance
of countering gender inequality and its two- and three-way interactions with the
manipulation of regulatory focus and the strength of moral objection measure into the
analysis as covariates.7
The results revealed a three-way interaction between the manipulation of regulatory
focus, the strength of moral conviction about gender equality, and the strength of moral
objections to hostile forms of collective action on the support for these forms of action,
B = –.25, SE = .11, F(1,139) = 5.07, p = .03, R2 = .03. To break down this interaction,
we performed two additional regression analyses: one for the promotion condition and
one for the prevention condition. In both of these analyses, we entered the strength of
moral conviction about gender equality, the strength of moral objections to hostile forms
of collective action, and their interaction term into the analysis while controlling for the
effect of the perceived importance of countering gender inequality and its interaction
with the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action. The results
revealed the predicted interaction in the prevention condition between the strength
of moral conviction about gender equality and the strength of moral objections to
hostile forms of collective action on the support for these forms of action, B = .47,
SE = .16, F(1,64) = 8.57, p = .005, R2 = .08, see Figure 4. Simple slope analyses
showed that in the prevention condition, moral objections to hostile forms of collective
action only decreased support for these forms of action among individuals with weak
moral conviction about gender equality, B = –1.01, SE = .25, F(1,64) = 16.81, p < .001.
As hypothesized, moral objections to hostile forms of collective action did not affect
support for these forms of action among individuals with a strong moral conviction
about gender equality, B = –.08, SE = .21, F < 1.
7Not including the importance of countering gender inequality and its interactions with the manipulation of regulatory focus
and the measure of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action makes the hypothesized three-way interaction
marginally significant (p = .08). However, in the prevention condition, the predicted interaction between the measures of
moral conviction and moral objections to hostile forms of collective action is still significant (p = .01) and the separate lines
consistent with predictions.
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In the promotion condition, support for hostile forms of collective action was
influenced neither by the strength of moral conviction about gender equality, nor
by the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action, nor by their
interaction (all Fs < 1). Importantly, neither the perceived importance of countering
gender inequality, nor any of its interactions with the manipulation of regulatory focus
and/or with the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action was
significantly related to the support for these forms of collective action, all Fs < 1.87,
ps > .17. Thus, the results reported above cannot be attributed to differences in the
perceived importance of countering gender inequality.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide additional evidence for the prediction that support for
hostile and benevolent forms of collective action in response to social discrimination can
best be seen as a prevention-oriented responses to perceived immorality. As predicted,
holding a strong moral conviction about gender equality was shown to cause individuals
under prevention focus to support benevolent as well as hostile forms of collective
action, even when they perceived hostile forms of collective action as immoral. Among
individuals under promotion focus, neither holding a strong moral conviction about
gender equality, nor holding moral objections to hostile forms of collective action
affected support for either benevolent or hostile forms of collective action. These findings
are in line with our argument that the ends justify the means for prevention-oriented
individuals with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group.
Study 2 thus extends the results of Study 1 by showing that the different responses of
promotion- and prevention-oriented individuals can be obtained using a manipulation of
regulatory focus instead of a measure. In addition, wewere able to rule out the possibility
that it is the importance of countering gender inequality rather than the moral conviction
with which this goal is held that causes the observed effects. Moreover, this second
study extends the results of the previous study by taking into account the strength of
participants’ moral objections to hostile forms of collective action.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current studies were designed to investigate the effects of regulatory focus on
the way moral considerations motivate hostile and benevolent forms of collective
action. Previous research has already shown that moral convictions can motivate
people to engage in benevolent forms of collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes,
& Spears, in press). With the current studies, we build on and extend these findings by
demonstrating that moral considerations also motivate hostile forms of collective action
and by elucidating why this is the case. We argued that because moral considerations
function as ‘oughts’ (i.e., goals of which non-achievement is seen as more negative
than achievement is seen as positive; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989), they should
affect behaviour through the prevention self-regulatory system. Furthermore, because
a prevention focus involves construing strong goals (such as those mandated by moral
conviction) as necessities (Scholer et al., 2010; Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal et al., in
press), we argued that the effects of holding a strong moral conviction about the fair
treatment of their group should cause the prevention-oriented to perceive any means
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to be justified in order to reach the necessary goal. Thus, we predicted that prevention-
oriented individuals (but not promotion-oriented individuals) who hold a strong moral
conviction about the fair treatment of their group would be willing to support hostile
forms of collective action, even when they themselves would consider these forms of
action immoral.
We examined these predictions in two studies. As predicted, the results of both
studies showed that moral convictions motivate both hostile and benevolent forms of
collective action through the prevention self-regulatory system. When the prevention
system was chronically active (Study 1) or experimentally activated (Study 2), holding
a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group increased support for
hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. By contrast, when the prevention
system was chronically inactive (Study 1) or when a promotion focus was induced
(Study 2), holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group had
no effect on support for either form of action. In addition, and as predicted, Study 2
showed that for prevention-oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about
the fair treatment of the group overrides moral objections to hostile forms of collective
action. More specifically, prevention-oriented individuals with a strong moral conviction
about the fair treatment of their group supported hostile forms of collective action even
when they perceived these forms as being immoral. Thus, for them the ends appeared
to justify the means.
Implications
The present work provides a deeper understanding of individuals’ willingness to
engage in hostile forms of collective action. The results of the studies reported in
this contribution suggest that violent, hostile forms of collective action may be better
understood as prevention-oriented responses to what is perceived as immoral treatment
of the ingroup. Prevention-oriented individuals construe strong goals (such as those
mandated by moral conviction) as necessities, which cause them to become insensitive
to objections to the way these goals are pursued. When prevention-oriented individuals
come to believe that their group is treated in an immoral way, they become highly
motivated to rectify this situation. Because under prevention focus, strong motivation is
experienced as necessity (instead of as ‘desire’ for individuals under promotion focus),
prevention-oriented individuals become insensitive to moral objections to the way group
status improvement is pursued, paving the way for the occurrence of hostile forms of
collective action such as terrorism (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).
On a practical level, the results of the present work show that there may be risks
associated with using moral arguments to promote collective action. More precisely,
because moral considerations affect behaviour through the prevention system, those
swayed by moral argumentation will come to see the collective goal more as a necessity
than as a desire, paving the way for the use of hostile means in pursuit of this goal.
Activists who use moral argumentation to mobilize others for their cause may thus
inadvertently create the conditions that facilitate the occurrence of hostile forms of
collective action. Alternatively, activists could consider framing their moral message
in terms fitting a promotion focus (i.e., by presenting it as representing a maximal
goal [ Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009]). This should cause those mobilized to see
the goal of collective action less as a necessity, thereby decreasing the likelihood that
hostile forms of collective action will be undertaken. However, this approach may have
drawbacks of its own. Because goal commitment under promotion focus depends heavily
on expectations of success (Shah & Higgins, 1997), trying to motivate collective action
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through reframing its moral goal in promotion-oriented terms should only be effective
when the likelihood that collective action will succeed is high (Zaal et al., in press), a
precondition that is rarely met (Hornsey et al., 2006).
Applying regulatory focus theory to the study of themotivation to engage in collective
action appears to be a fruitful endeavour on a broader theoretical level as well. In recent
years, the collective action literature has benefited greatly from work investigating the
relative strength of different motivators (e.g., instrumentality, perceptions of injustice,
and different forms of social identification) on commitment to collective action (e.g.,
Kelly, 1993; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2005; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). A logical
next step would be to investigate the situations under which, and the individuals for
whom, some factors form stronger motivators of collective action than others, or have
different effects on some than on others. Understanding the self-regulatory processes
underlying the motivation to engage in collective action promises to be especially
important in this next theoretical step. For example, in our own work (Zaal et al.,
in press), we have shown that the distinction between promotion and prevention
focus helps to understand how instrumental motives affect the decision to engage in
collective action. More precisely, this work has shown that instrumental considerations
(i.e., those relating to the expectation that collective action will succeed or not) only
motivate promotion-oriented (and not prevention-oriented) individuals to engage in
collective action, providing an explanation for inconsistent support for the role of
instrumental considerations in the motivation to engage in collective action (Van
Zomeren et al., 2008). The present work complements these findings by showing
that perceptions of injustice and immorality motivate prevention-oriented (and not
promotion-oriented) individuals to engage in collective action (see also Sassenberg &
Hansen, 2007). Together, these strands of research show how regulatory focus nicely
fits into the perspective proposed by Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) in which
perceptions of injustice and instrumental considerations are held to form two separate
motivational paths to engagement in collective action.
In this research, we investigated individuals’ support for hostile forms of collective
action on behalf of their group. This does not necessarily imply that our results generalize
to personal engagement in hostile forms of collective action. Actively engaging in (vs.
passively supporting) hostile forms of collective action may involve additional risk.
Previous research has suggested that a prevention focus involves an aversion towards
risk (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Because of this risk aversion, it could be that prevention-
oriented individuals personally refrain from engaging in hostile forms of collective action,
even if they support them. While this may seem plausible, recent work has shown that
prevention-oriented individuals are not always risk averse (Scholer, Stroessner, &Higgins,
2008; Scholer et al., 2010). More specifically, prevention-oriented individuals, when
pursuing goals they deem necessities, are willing to take risks if taking risks is the only
way to reach their goal. If, as we claim, prevention-oriented individuals construe the goal
of collective action as a necessity when they hold this goal with moral conviction, then
they should be willing to personally engage in hostile (risky) forms of collective action
when benevolent (safe) avenues towards social change are closed. Importantly, research
has found hostile forms of collective action to occur precisely in these situations (Gurr,
1993; Louis et al., 2011; Spears, Scheepers, & Van Zomeren, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011).
Thus, because they see social change as a necessity, prevention-oriented individuals with
a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should be especially
likely to actually engage in hostile forms of collective action in these situations.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of two studies demonstrated that regulatory focus affects
the extent to which holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of
their group leads individuals to become willing to support both hostile and benevolent
forms of collective action. Holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment
of the group motivated individuals under prevention focus, but not individuals under
promotion focus, to engage in benevolent collective action. Furthermore, prevention
(but not promotion) oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about the
fair treatment of their group were also willing to support more extreme, hostile forms
of collective action. This was even the case when these same individuals viewed these
hostile forms of collective action as inherently immoral. Thus, for prevention-oriented
individuals, the ends (social change) appeared to justify the means (hostile forms of
collective action).
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Appendix
List of items used
STUDY 1
Prevention scale
In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life.
I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations.
I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future.
I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals.
I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me.
I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life.
Promotion scale
I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations.
I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future.
I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future.
I often think about how I will achieve academic success.
My major goal in university right now is to achieve my academic ambitions.
I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my ‘ideal self’, to fulfill my
hopes, wishes, and aspirations.
Moral conviction about gender equality
Equality between men and women is part of the core of my moral convictions
My opinion about gender equality is closely related to how I see myself.
My opinion about gender equality has a moral character.
I could be friends with someone who does not have a problem with gender inequality
(reverse scored).
It would be very difficult for me to be friends with someone who has another opinion
about gender equality than I have.
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Support for benevolent forms of collective action
‘I would be willing to support . . .
becoming a member of a collective action group that takes a stance against gender
discrimination.
becoming a volunteer for a collective action group that takes a stance against gender
discrimination.
taking part in a demonstration against gender discrimination’.
serving as a fundraiser for a collective action group that takes a stance against gender
discrimination’.
Support for hostile forms of collective action
‘I would be willing to support . . .
the organization of illegal wild strikes at organizations that discriminate against
women.
the occupation of the buildings of organizations that discriminate against women.
throwing up barricades at organizations that discriminate against women, keeping
their employees from going to work.
defacing the buildings of organizations that discriminate against women. (Item added
in Study 2.)
committing sabotage at organizations that discriminate against women’.
STUDY 2
Importance of countering gender inequality
Countering gender discrimination is very important to me.
I do not think countering gender discrimination is very important (reverse scored).
I think it is very important that the structural discrimination of women is countered.
Moral objections to hostile forms of collective action
I think harming the interests of organizations that discriminate is morally objectionable.
Because of moral objections, I would never take part in actions that harm the interests
of organizations that discriminate.
I think it is morally justifiable to harm the interests of organizations that discriminate
(reverse scored).
I would find it difficult to be friends with someone who believed it is justifiable to harm
the interests of organizations that discriminate (reverse scored).
